It took more than ten years to ascertain that India had actually failed to put up a determined fight against the Pakistani ingress in Kargil.

And for this not only the military leadership but also the political leadership of the country ought to be blamed. Had Brigadier Devinder Singh who led the Batalik-based 70 Infantry Brigade during the war not petitioned the Delhi High Court in 2006, complaining of misrepresentation of his battle performance which cost him a war medal and led to his being passed over for promotion as Major-General, the truth would not have come out.
The Armed Forces Tribunal looking into the matter of Brig Singh had gone to the extent of directing the Directorate of Military Operations to rewrite portions of an official history: Account of the War in Kargil as top commanders falsified accounts of battles in the Batalik sector. It also directed the Army to expunge Lieutenant-General Kishan Pal’s assessment of Brig Singh. Lt-Gen Pal evidently had fabricated records underplaying the role of his most successful subordinate. What was worst, the Tribunal said, “they cannot trust the report prepared by Lieutenant-General Pal.” The observations of the Tribunal are an indictment of the military leadership in the 1999 Kargil war.
The Kargil war was the most controversial battle fought with the Pakistan. Just after the war the then Pakistan President Gen Pervez Musharraf had roared and cautioned India not to venture again to challenge the Pakistan Army. A month ahead of the war, precisely in April 1999, Lieutenant-General Pal was warned that an intrusion could take place.  But he rubbished the information. He also kept the political leadership in dark. Once the war finally took place he, in order to protect himself and his superiors from the consequences of gross errors of judgment, fabricated records.
It is beyond imagination how could a Lieutenant General stoop so low and fudge the war accounts. It was due to his wrong feedback to the government and headquarters that the war continued for 80 days. Lieutenant-General Pal had promised to end the war in 48 hours and also told the Chief of the Army Staff that just 45 Pakistani irregulars were positioned in Batalik. But the fact was 600-odd regular Pakistani soldiers were in operation. The Brigadier’s assessment was again proved correct by the questioning of captured prisoners of war. Obviously the question arises: why did Lt-Gen Pal try to downplay the actual threat perception? This incident also provides an insight into the functioning of the Indian Army, which is badly split and officers working at cross purposes. It was his wrong information that took the Indian Air Force nearly a fortnight to join the war.    
Even after this revelation it was surprising to witness that former army chief Gen V P Malik, who led the forces during the Kargil operation, described the whole episode as an “aberration”. Will Gen Malik clarify, if this is an aberration then what could be a deliberate attempt to denigrate and demoralise the Army and humiliate the country? How could Lt-Gen Pal ignore that this was a battle for honour? It also needs to be emphatically mentioned that India’s “timid” response to the Pakistani military ingress in Kargil in 1999 has been primarily responsible for series of terrorist strikes against India beginning with the attack on Parliament in 2001. One thing is absolutely clear that there are more facts about the humiliation Indian Army suffered in Kargil and these need to be made public. The government should set up a high level inquiry preferably by Army officials to investigate the role of the government and actions of the military leadership in Kargil.