BY LALIT MANSINGH
INDIA doesn’t want that 1962 should be repeated. Though there is no immediate threat of a shooting war, the possibility of a Chinese attack on India can’t be ruled out altogether.

According to the latest Pentagon assessment the expanding military might of China, which has now overtaken Japan to become the world’s second-largest economy, holds that Beijing is “concerned” with the “strategic ramifications of India’s rising economic, political and military power”. Consequently, “to improve regional deterrence”, the 2.25-million strong People’s Liberation Army has moved “more advanced and survivable” solid-fuelled CCS-5 nuclear-capable ballistic missiles closer to the borders with India. China may also be developing contingency plans to move airborne troops into the region. China continues to upgrade its already massive build-up of military infrastructure all along the unresolved 4,057-km Line of Actual Control, particularly over Arunachal Pradesh, which China asserts is part of Tibet and therefore of China, and over the Askai Chin region in Ladakh. 
China, of course, continues to needle India with frequent troop incursions across the LAC, from Trig Heights and Pangong Tso Lake in eastern Ladakh to the “finger area” in Sikkim and Asaphila sector in Arunachal Pradesh.
In response India is frantically engaged in building road and bridges all along the LAC and plans to test its most ambitious ballistic missile, the 5,000-km Agni-V, by early 2011 to add to its military deterrence posture. Moreover, apart from the almost ready-to-be-inducted 3,500-km Agni-III, IAF has already begun to base Sukhoi-30MKI fighters in Northeast as well as upgrade several airstrips and helipads in the region. New Delhi knows that one of the key challenges for India’s foreign and security policy for the next decade and beyond will be the management of China’s emergence as a great Asian and, increasingly, global power. For both countries, Asia remains the principal platform for power projection.
Competitive Relations
In fashioning an appropriate China strategy, India must recognise that the essential character of India-China relations is and will remain competitive. We represent two contrasting but long-standing civilisations. Each has its own deeply rooted cultural ethos despite the shared legacy of Buddhism. In more contemporary times, China has seen its emergence in Asia as regaining its historical, though sometimes mythical, status as a pre-eminent power, at the summit of a hierarchical economic and security architecture in the region. There has been and will continue to be resistance to the emergence of any rival centre of political and economic power. This has been a consistent theme throughout the past 60-years of China’s posture towards India.
However, in a classic exercise of the Chinese art of “walking on two legs”, China has also sought to cultivate a more positive and benign relationship with India, to avoid tipping India into an overt and threatening military alliance with one or more of China’s adversaries. More recently, tactical alliances with India have been useful to China in safeguarding its interests on several global issues such as climate change and multilateral trade. The “Copenhagen spirit” is a manifestation of this. Tactically, there may be, at times, a more friendly and cooperative approach. At other times, there may be negative pressures, such as activism on the unsettled border or a more threatening posture on the Tibet issue. What is critical for us to recognise is that this does not deflect China from its strategic objective of preventing India from challenging her march towards predominance and pre-eminence in Asia.
Target: India
Let us look at the historical record. China has never hesitated to use its alliance with Pakistan to keep India tethered firmly in South Asia. We have a rare example here of a nuclear weapon state actively assisting a non-nuclear weapon state in acquiring both strategic weapons and the means of delivery. The target was India. This has been for China a low-cost, low-risk means of constraining India without having to confront her directly. In fact, at crucial junctures, China has refrained from intervening on behalf of Pakistan. This happened in 1965, in 1971 and again more recently during the Kargil conflict.
In December 1971, the US NSA, Henry Kissinger, virtually pleaded with his Chinese interlocutor, Ambassador Huang Hua, to carry out some military operations on India’s borders to relieve the pressure on Pakistan. But China did not bite. China has worked against India’s claim to permanent membership of the UN Security Council and lobbied actively to deny India the waiver from the NSG. 
India must learn to pursue its interests with the same unsentimental calculation that China displays in advancing her perceived interests. We, too, need to learn to “walk on two legs” and pursue a more nuanced policy. We should welcome constructive engagement with China on issues where our interests are convergent. At the same time, we should not hesitate to demonstrate our willingness to defend our interests with firmness. It was interesting to see that during our NSA’s recent visit to China, the two sides spoke of the need to respect each other’s “core concerns”. This is a good sign provided there is clarity about what these core concerns are and how legitimate they are perceived to be by others. We should not accept that China’s territorial claim to the South China Sea is its legitimate core concern.
Growing Chinese Clout
There is no doubt that in the aftermath of the global economic and financial crisis, China has acquired greater diplomatic clout in relation to other major powers. This has the potential of shrinking our own room for manoeuvre and increasing our vulnerability. However, precisely because of our own display of economic resilience and dynamism, and the significant acquisition of military, in particular, naval capabilities, our diplomatic clout, too, has increased. The sheer weight of India’s sub-continental profile makes it an indispensable partner in tackling any global or cross-cutting issue such as energy security, non-proliferation and public health. Here is an opportunity to expand our own strategic space vis-a-vis other major powers, including China.
It has been our experience that China has been more accommodating towards India whenever it has felt that India’s range of options had expanded. The more diplomatic options India is perceived to have, the more diversified its relations with other major powers, the greater the display of accommodation on the part of China on Sino-Indian issues. Therefore, we should actively pursue coalition-building globally as well as with all those major powers who wish to see a more plural and loosely structured economic and security architecture in Asia. This is not a containment policy towards China. It is a strategy of expanding India’s options, which would help manage relations with friends and adversaries alike. After all, even friends should know that we have alternatives available. –INAV