BY RAVINDRA SHUKLA
THE Union Home Minister, Mr P Chidambaram’s remark that “something went wrong,” during the anti-Naxal operation in the Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh is an admission that the flawed plan drawn up by the home ministry, the so-called ‘Action Plan’ created in October 2009, for the anti-Naxal offensive in the country needs to be revisited.

A High Price: The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) jawans have already paid a high price for the lack of clarity in the ministry which now says it is “learning lessons” along the way. “We need to analyse the incident to draw lessons for the future. The security force personnel need to understand that the standard operating procedures cannot be violated. Whether they need to undergo more vigorous training for such operations is something that we need to study,” an official said.
The one-man Inquiry Committee with former Border Security Force (BSF) Director, General E N Rammohan to “establish the circumstances and sequence of events” leading to the deadly Maoist attack on April 6, will draw lessons for the future. It is expected to submit its findings to the ministry in fifteen days.
Lack of Manpower and Training
The plan envisaged two kinds of operations in Maoist-infested states. The “intra-state” operations were to be conducted by the state police forces assisted by Central forces to flush out the ultras from within a Maoist-infested state.
The second, a more difficult and time-consuming one, would be the “inter-state’’ operations at bi-junctions and tri-junctions of two or three Naxal-affected states like Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Orissa, West Bengal and Jharkhand. This would involve a heavy deployment of Central forces who would actively assist the state police forces to clear out territory under Maoist domination as part of an “area domination” exercise. This would immediately be followed by developmental works like schools, healthcare, police stations and roads.
“Security forces will hold the area after it is cleared of Maoists and developmental works will be initiated,” a government official had said then. The timeline? Some 12 to 36 months for wiping out entirely the military component of the Naxals.
Operations began in November last year and were expected to gather pace in the succeeding three to six months. But the plan died before it even began.
And the voices of dissent among the Central and state police forces, is only growing louder. “It was absolutely foolish for the home ministry to draw up an action plan in New Delhi and then carry out the operations. It should have been a decision taken at the local level and the operations conducted at a time when the local police forces deem it fit,” a police officer involved with the anti-Naxal operations said on condition of anonymity.
The official also argued that the Central forces, even though in large numbers, cannot undertake an “area domination” exercise since they are not familiar with the terrain and conditions unlike the Maoists.
The problem is compounded by the fact that state police forces also suffer from limited manpower and training to undertake intense operations conducted over a long period of time.
Government estimates reveal that there are at least three lakh vacancies in the state police forces alone.
The Central forces–the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the Border Security Force (BSF), The Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) –who have been engaged in anti-Naxal operations neither have the mental conditioning nor the training to tackle the militarised Maoists in areas which have been ruled by them for decades.
The involvement of ex-armymen and ex-paramilitary personnel in the training of Maoists must begin. “Our paramilitary personnel are trained. But are they trained enough to engage in such intense operations against Maoists,” asked an official.
Drawing comparisons with the Indian Army, the official said, “Our paramilitary personnel are not trained like the Army. They are also on continuous deployment and do not have peace-time postings like the Army. That’s why they are called the paramilitary.”
Paying for Protection
The essential question that arises in the end is whether the Central Reserve Police Force  (CRPF) and other paramilitary forces have been pushed into the “Maoist war-zone” too soon and too fast. Could we not have waited a little longer to firm up plans and policies to deal with Left wing extremism?
If you ask the government, the answer is a firm ‘No’ as it points to the ‘Red terror ‘co-opting 2,000 police station areas in 223 districts across 20 states in the country.
How do 15000-20000 Maoists sustain themselves in so-called the “liberated zone” in so many affected states? Several training camps are run in the areas like Bastar and Dandakarayana to keep this mammoth training apparatus running.
The Naxals operate an elaborate extortion and taxation system in the tribal belt they dominate. The majority of funds, anywhere between Rs 1000 to Rs 1500 crore annually comes from the tax levied by the Naxals on trucks plying through the mineral-rich forest areas.
The levy varies from a few thousand rupees for a truck full of iron ore or bauxite to astronomical sums for illegal teak wood from the forests. Forest produce, like tendu patta (used for bidis), saal seeds and mahua flowers, is the biggest money spinner. Most produce carried out of the forests is charged according to number of sacks. “A nominal amount of Rs 10 is charged for each sack, and lakhs of such sacks are illegally sent out of the forest,” sources said.
Most industrialists, businessman, contractors and even government officials in the Maoist-affected territories are known to give into extortion demands, in return for protection.
“Even petty businessmen and tribals selling wares at weekly haats (village markets) are not immune,” a senior intelligence officer said.
Extortion is blatant with Naxal cadres putting up road blocks as collection centres. Less obvious is the role of NGOs, who may be fronting for the Maoists, and supplying with medicines, rations, clothes. Of course, Maoists are also encouraging tribals to adopt poppy cultivation, which is the biggest source of earning.–INAV