BY PRAMOD TIWARI

GREAT controversy is brewing as to whose responsibility it is to tackle the Maoist menace in the country.

The UPA government is of the opinion that it is a law and order problem, thus it is the duty of the state governments to take on the Maoists. But in view of the growing ferocity of attacks on paramilitary forces, it is beyond the capability of state governments to tackle the situation.

In broader terms, the Maoists have openly challenged the Centre to fight them out in the "red corridor" extending in nine states covering 262 districts of the country. Unless the red menace is controlled, Indian democracy faces its severest test of survival.

Insurgency Again

One may argue that the Maoist threat has been there in different forms since the year 1946, though there was a gap of about 15-16- years between the first and the second phases.

In the first phase, the then Communist Party of India (CPI) converted the movement against the Nizam of Hyderabad into an agrarian uprising to capture power.

Everything that Maoists do today, like attacking police stations, launching guerrilla warfare and having armed underground cadres, was also done in the past. Even after Hyderabad was liberated in 1948, the CPI struggle continued till 1952.

After a gap of fifteen years, the Naxal movement started and this has now spread to many states. It has emerged due to many factors including failure of the system, widening gap between the rich and the poor, non-delivery of services by the state and growing distance between the political leadership and the people, particularly in rural areas.

While the state is responsible for the maintenance of law and order under the Constitution, state boundaries have become convenient areas for Maoist operations because of the different commands.

In such a scenario, most of the subjects like service delivery and economic inequalities, and not just law and order, have to be addressed by the central government.

Failure of the System

At the preparatory stage, when the Maoists start building up contacts at the local level, only the state government can deal with the issue.

Though the policy framework may rest with the Centre, it is the responsibility of the state to address the socio-economic aspects besides tackling law and order. But insurgency has to be taken care of by the central government.

The preparatory stage involves identifying local problems and resolving them. At this stage, the first indication that people are unhappy comes in the form of some kind of demands from the local leaders or slogans written on walls, etc. The state should intervene at this stage and address the issues besides gathering intelligence through formal and informal channels.

Taking care of everything that is happening at this stage is the job of local revenue officials, medical officers, police, forest officials, tribal welfare offices, sarpanch, etc.

After this stage, when the Maoists go underground and start procuring weapons, it is again the responsibility of the state to gather information and set matters right through local officials.

When an offence takes place, the state has to follow the law and book a case against the culprit, and also arrest and prosecute him. Similarly, the state has to address the socio-economic factors leading to such activity.

The Centre has two responsibilities–inter-state coordination and providing financial and other required assistance. The Centre should pave the way for inter-state coordination but not take total responsibility. Unfortunately, this has not been done, though the Centre has been aware of the problem for quite some time.

Deploying the army for tackling the Naxalites is not the right thing to do. The army can’t function effectively unless all wings of the state administration are in its hands — this amounts to imposing President’s rule.

The Centre should come out with workable coordinating machinery that would help the states in tackling the problem. This may take time, but it is necessary. Meanwhile, the states should prepare for such a mechanism as a part of an all-India strategy.

Moreover, it is dangerous for the army or CRPF to undertake combing operations in the forests without the involvement of the local police or a detailed plan. The local police alone can get the required information, know the terrain and assess the type of threats that are in store while conducting the operations.

Ultimately, nothing is possible without people’s cooperation, which can be ensured only when the state government takes necessary initiatives.

Violent Agendas

It took fifteen years to counter terrorism in Punjab. In Jammu and Kashmir, it has been two decades. In the valley, the situation was different when the Centre took charge. The same is the situation in Maoist controlled areas.

We have been hearing insensitive statements from the Directors General of Police of the states about the armed forces which are helping the state.

The police heads were members of the central paramilitary forces and instead of sitting in judgement on the central forces they need to get their acts together and fast. I don’t think the lack of "development" is an issue in these areas. If it was, then why do the Naxalites blow up schools and other indicators of development? Their ideology is a violent one–it aims at overthrowing the state.

Development is important to isolate the Naxalites from people. But hard power has to do its work before the soft power of development can have any impact. And if the state governments are incapable of tackling the problem it is duty of the Centre to step in.

But eventually, the role of the Centre is limited to helping the state in building capacities. It can extend and implement the Panchayat Raj Extended to Schedule Area Act (PESA) as also the Forest Rights Act. And it can provide the highest level of funding to help ease the situation.

But as things stand, unless the central government intervenes Maoist insurgency can’t be quelled.–INAV